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COMMENTS

Federal Products Liability Legislation:
Not the Cure for Worker's
Compensation Ailments
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two major areas of the law have recently begun to draw public
attention: products liability law and worker compensation acts. Product manufacturers, who are being subjected to more frequent and
larger damages awards, are calling for federal reform of state products liability law.'
Concerns about state worker's compensation acts are being
expressed by negligent third parties who are not covered by the acts,
yet because of the acts they frequently must pay for more of an in2
jured employee's damages than their negligence caused. This situation occurs when the other negligent party, the employer, is shielded
from suit by an exclusive-remedy provision under the act. While products liability law and worker's compensation acts are conceptually
and procedurally two separate and different methods of recovery, they
frequently are forced to interact: when the negligent third party is
a product manufacturer.'
For some time Congress has been working on proposals for federal
product liability legislation." Such legislation aims to alleviate the
perceived hardships on manufacturers under the present system. In
all of the proposals so far, however, Congress has attempted to go
farther than merely deal with liability standards for manufacturers
in suits by injured plaintiffs. It has also attempted to deal with the
potential inequity to the product manufacturer when the injured plain1. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
2. Robinson, Workmen's Compensation: The Third Party Dilemma, 19 IDAHO

L. REV. 259, 265-66 (1983).

3. Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Worker's Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035.
4. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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tiff also happens to be an employee covered by a worker's compensation act. The inequity is basically the inability of the negligent
manufacturer to seek contribution from a sometimes equally negligent
party, when that party is the injured worker's employer. The result
is that the manufacturer frequently pays damages in greater proportion than his fault.'
The proposed legislative solution to this inequity consists of
eliminating employer subrogation rights and including an automatic
reduction of manufacturer tort damages liability.' These are drastic
changes from the current law and practice. These provisions will essentially result in almost as much inequity as that which prompted their
creation, only under this proposed Scheme the burden will fall on
different parties: the employers.
This comment will discuss the basic elements in products liability
law and in worker compensation statutes, and the way in which the
two systems currently interact. It will then discuss the steps that some
states have taken and the proposals scholars have made to remedy
the inequity that results from this interaction. The relevant provisions
in the proposed federal products liability legislation will then be examined, and the foreseeable, but undesirable, effects that the provisions will have if enacted will be discussed. Finally, this comment
will propose an alternative solution which more equitably addresses
the expectations of all of the parties involved than the legislative proposal does.
II.
A.

PRODUCT LIABILITY PROBLEMS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW

Modern products liability law is largely judge-made common law7
which serves to compensate persons injured by defective products,
and has its roots in traditional tort law.' The predominant theories
of recovery are those of negligence, breach of warranty, and strict
liability.' Early products liability required the injured plaintiff be in
5. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.'
6. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
7. Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case For Federal
Action, 63 NEB. L. REV. 389, 391 (1984).
8. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 643, 644 (1978).
9. W. PROSSER & W.

KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 95, at 678 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
A recently developed theory of recovery is that of "market share liability."
Reed, supra note 7, at 402.
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privity of contract with the defendant manufacturer.'" If the requisite
privity existed, the plaintiff could apply basic tort law principles and
bring suit if the manufacturer had been negligent."
Under this system, there were many defenses available to the
manufacturer which made recovery by the plaintiff difficult.'" If the
manufacturer could prove the plaintiff's contributory negligence,' 3 that
the plaintiff had assumed the risk of using the product,"' or that the
plaintiff was not, in fact, in privity of contract with the manufacturer, then the plaintiff could not recover.'I
Recognition of the unjustness of the privity rule" prompted its
rejection. in 1916.'" In the 1960's, a full swing toward consumer pro-

10. This rule was first enunciated in 1842 in the case of Winterbottom v. Wright,
10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). The justifications given for the privity
rule were that the harm to an ultimate purchaser was unforeseeable to the original
seller, and that manufacturers would be burdened too much if held liable to many
unforeseeable consumers. PROSSER, supra note 9,§ 95A, at 681.
11. Epstein, supra note 8, at 646. Basic principles of tort law determine whether
compensation is due the plaintiff, and are generally regarded as follows: 1.Defendant is not responsible for Acts of God. 2. Defendant is not responsible for actions
of third parties. 3. Defendant is not liable when plaintiff's actions were the cause
of the injury. 4. Defendant is not liable when defendant's actions combine with plaintiff's actions to cause the injury. 5. Defendant is liable when his own negligence
caused the injury. See id. at 645.
12. Gerry, President's Page, 17 TLA. 11, Nov. 1981, at 4.
13. Contributory negligence is defined as "conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection." The plaintiff's contributory negligence traditionally precluded him from any recovery. PROSSER,
supra note 9, § 65, at 451, 451-52.
14. "Assumption of risk" appears to have many different interpretations, but
it basically means that the plaintiff, somehow, has expressed his understanding of
the risk involved and that he is willing to bear the responsibility himself for any
injury resulting to him. Id. § 68, at 480-81.
15. Gerry, supra note 12.
It has been said of this early system of products liability that: "The inputs
of both plaintiffs and defendants were thus taken fairly into account so that, roughly
speaking, the defendant was held liable only when his own conduct was casually
dominant in the case." Epstein, supra note 8, at 646. A different view of this system
is that: "Caveat Emptor" became the rule of the land. "The populace used products
at its peril, without redress for injuries they caused or havoc they wreaked." Gerry, supra
note 12.
16. One who is not party to a contract, yet suffers injury during the performance of that contract, should not be denied recovery. Labatt, Negligence in Relation to Privity of Contract, 16 LAW Q. REv. 168, 171-72 (1900).
17. See MacPherson v.Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
(Automobile manufacturer held liable to ultimate purchaser ofocar for injuries caused
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tection began. In 1962 the principle of strict liability was judicially
adopted into the developing law of products liability.' 8 In 1965 the
Restatement (Second) of Torts created a strict liability in tort cause
of action for products liability cases.' 9 Soon to follow was the judicial
adoption of strict liability with regard to bystanders injured by a product, persons who previously had no ability to sue."0
This change in attitude toward products liability law, which now
allowed strict liability for manufacturers, was justified in several ways
by the courts. It was argued that manufacturers are in the best posiby defective wheel, in spite of intervening purchase and sale of car by auto dealer,
when manufacturer knew that car was certain to be resold to ultimate users.)
18. Epstein, supra note 8, at 647.
"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being." Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, (1962).
19. Reed, supra note 7, at 391-92.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A provides that:
"(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller."
Comment (a) to this section notes that "The rule is one of strict liability, making
the seller subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

20. The rationale for disallowing bystanders to recover for injuries caused by
a defective product, in the absence of manufacturer negligence, was that the bystander
was qutside of the chain of distribution. Epstein, supra note 8, at 647. See Rodriguez
v. Shell's City, 141 So.2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (bystander, injured when
a defective part on a sanding kit broke and struck him in the eye while sander was
being used by purchaser, could not recover damages against the manufacturer). In
the late 1960's courts began to depart from this rule and began to allow bystanders
to recover for injuries sustained from defective products. The theory was that strict
liability should make manufacturers liable for all of the foreseeable injuries caused
by a defectively made product. Further, bystanders deserved as much protection as
that given to purchasers of a product, especially since bystanders had in no way
assumed the risk of any danger in the use of the product, as the purchaser may
have done. PRossER,esupra note 9, § 100, at 704; Epstein, supra note 8, at 647.
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tion to distribute the costs of the injuries caused by their products
2
by incorporating these costs into the price of the products. ' It was
also said that manufacturers will be more careful, and therefore pro22
ducts will be safer, because of the imposition of strict liability.
Furthermore, strict liability in tort for manufacturers was warranted
because it is frequently difficult for an injdred plaintiff to actually
prove the negligence of the manufacturer.2 3
B.

MODERN DAY PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW

The central concept in products liability law is "defect." The
manufacturer's liability for a defective product in a products liability
2'
action was based either on the manufacturer's negligence, breach
of warranty, or strict liability. Until the late 1960's there were three
possible types of product defects for which a manufacturer could be
held liable. These defects were: manufacturing defects, design defects,
and warning or labeling defects. 5 In the case of manufacturing, or
construction defects, the issue was whether or not the product had
26
been constructed in accordance with its intended design. Essentially
these are considered to be flawed products." Liability of the manufac"
turer was also based on the design of his product. These defects
were not due to negligence in production of the good, but rather due
to the inadequate design of the product. 9 Inadequate design was found
when the product, used in the ordinary manner, did not perform as
21. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J. concurring) (negligence should not be the only basis for plaintiff's
recovery; public policy now demands that a manufacturer who is responsible for
a product entering the market should bear responsibility for injuries caused a defective product as a cost of doing business).
22. First National Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am, Agricultural Products, 88
N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (1975).
23. Phipps. v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976).
For a thorough analysis of products liability policy, see Owen, Rethinking the Policies
of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980).
24. It should be noted that manufacturers are not the only persons to be held
liable for a defective product now. Prosser mentions many others types of defendants who could be held liable: any product seller, makers of component parts,

assemblers of parts, processors, dealers, second-hand dealers, and those who represent a product as theirs. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 100, at 704.
25. Epstein, supra note 8, at 648-49.
26. D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 140 (1974).

27. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 96, at 685. A "flaw" is defined as "a condition
of the product that is different from what it was intended to be." Id.
28. Id. § 96, at 688.
29. D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 26, at 140.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

it was expected to. 0 Finally, a manufacturer could be held liable for
a labeling defect on the product, also considered a failure to warn
defect.'
In the late 1960's, however, changes occurred which created the
products liability system of today.3" The expansion of what conditions in a product will tonstitute a "defect,"" and the erosion of
some manufacturer defenses have been pointed to as the two predominant changes in the products liability law which have created much
greater liability than existed previously for product manufacturers." '
The traditional concept of defect 5 was expanded to include the
lack of extra safety features on the product, even those which were
unrelated to the basic performance of the product. 3 This new definition of defect increased the liability of manufacturers because injured
plaintiffs could now "design" safety devices which would have
prevented their injury, thereby showing the product was defective."
One of the traditional defenses of manufacturers, that of plaintiff conduct, ,has also been altered in a way that expands manufac30. Vandercook and Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 395 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1968).

31. Manufacturers have a duty to warn the product user of risks that exist
in the ordinary or reasonably foreseeable uses of the product. PROSSER, supra note
9, § 96, at 685.
32. See generally Epstein, supra note 8.
33. Another, perhaps compatible, view is that manufacturer liability has increased greatly because of the many different interpretations of the word defect:
"Unfortunately, the only consensus regarding the present meaning of "defect" is
that there is no consensus. The courts have developed numerous formulations, but
none has proven satisfactory." Reed, supra note 7, at 399.
34. Epstein, supra note 8, at 648-57. Another source describes the changes which
have increased manufacturer liability as being: "pro-consumer plaintiff bias, manifested
by more frequent, larger jury awards and liberalization of legal theories to facilitate
plaintiffs' suits. The widespread adoption of strict liability, development of new
theories such as enterprise and market share liability, the erosion of traditional defenses
such as the patent danger rule and state of the art, and expansion of time limits
within which suit can be brought are primary examples of this legal liberalization
trend." Dworkin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TULANE L. REV.

602, 602-04 (1982).
35. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
36. Epstein, supra note 8, at 649. The case cited as marking the "shift in judicial
attitudes towards all products liability actions," is Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co.,
2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (lack of special mirrors and
reverse warning bells on paydozer was sufficient evidence of defect to go to jury).
37. Epstein, supra note 8, at 650.
See, e.g., Sutowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d
749 (1972) (design alternatives which were technologically feasible and could have
been installed on machine are admissible to show death could have been prevented).
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turer liability. It has been said that defenses of contributory negligence,
misuse, and assumption of the risk have been weakened to the point
that the plaintiff is no longer required to use ordinary care in order
to recover.3
These changes in products liability law are claimed to have caused
the products liability "crisis" of the 1970's.3 9 The increasing frequency
of damage awards,'0 coupled with increasing size of the awards,", put
a heavy financial burden on product manufacturers in the form of
greatly increased liability insurance.' 2
In response to manufacturers' calls for relief, state legislatures
began to enact. legislation directed at products liability law.' 3 State
statutory reform, however, has been scant and piecemeal at best,"

38. Epstein, supra note 8, at 654-55. Again a different, but perhaps compatible, view is that manufacturer liability has increased because of the great uncertainty
of their defenses: "So widely does the law vary from state to state that few accurate
generalizations can be made concerning the defenses that courts will allow." Reed,
supra note 7, at 410.
39. See. generally Epstein, supra note 8.
40. One source reports that products liability suits have increased 500% since
1974. Shumway, Needed: a Federal Product Liability Law, 3 CAL. LAW. 11, Nov.
1983, at 11. Another source states that the number of products liability claims increased 300% in ten years, from 1973 to 1983. See Product Liability Act: Hearings
on S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983) (opening statement by Senator Kasten)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
41. According to one study, damages awards in products liability suits in one
county between 1975-1979 increased by an average of $234,000 to an average award
of $377,000. Dworkin, supra note 34, at 602 n.l.
42. A survey done by the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability indicated
that manufacturers of industrial equipment, pharmaceuticals, and other high-risk products experienced an average of over two hundred percent increases in insurance
premiums between 1976 and 1977. Between 1975 and 1978, many business' insurance
rates increased over 1,000 percent. This has caused many small businesses to either
stop producing high-risk products or to merge with other businesses. It has also caused
businesses to obtain less coverage for their money, or forego coverage altogether.
Vulnerability to suit has also had a chilling effect on the development of new drugs
and other products. Schwartz, The Federal Government and the Product Liability
Problem: From Task-Force Investigation to Decisions by the Administration, 47 U.
CIN. L. REV. 573, 577 (1978).
43. Reed, supra note 7, at 392-93. These "reform measures" were generally
in the form of statutes of repose and statutory defenses for manufacturers. Id. at 420.
44. It has been stated that "Only 32 states have a product liability statute;
each one is different and none is comprehensive." Shumway, supra note 40, at 11.
The wide state to state variance in products liability laws has been attributed
to: "(1) multiple causes of action; (2) divergent definitions of "defect"; (3) judicial
creation and extension of theories of recovery; (4) differences in defenses allowed
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and many feel the current product liability system is a source of confusion and unnecessary manufacturer liability."'
The federal government also has taken steps toward alleviating

the products liability "crisis."' 6 After conducting a study which confirmed the existence of some products liability problems,' 7 the federal
government undertook to produce federal products liability legisla-

tion."8 Following the promulgation of the Uniform Products Liability
Act,"' three different products liability bills have been introduced into Congress."0 Each would have controlled products liability actions

nationwide if enacted, but thus far none has passed.' The implemen-

in strict liability actions; and (5) variations in the admissibility of "subsequent repairs"
evidence." Reed, supra note 7, at 396. Compare Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596
F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (evidence of product improvements made after injury not
admissible), with Abel v. J.C. Penny Co., 488 F. Supp. 891 (D. Minn. 1980) (evidence
of product improvements admitted).
45. A product which is not deemed defective under one state's product liability law may be found so under another state's law. See Hearings, supra note 40,
at 274.
46. See Shumway, supra note 40. It should be noted that many feel the responsibility for the products liability "crisis" lies with insurance rate-makers, who engaged in panic pricing of products liability insurance rates in the mid-1970's. See,
e.g., Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of
Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663, 678-79 (1978).
47. The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability did an eighteen month
study of the products liability system. It issued a final report, which identified three
major reasons for the product liability problem: "liability insurance ratemaking procedures, the tort litigation system, and manufacturing practices." United States Dep't
of Commerce, The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Final Report, at
1-20 (1977).
48. The task of formulating a federal products liability bill fell on the Subcommittee on the Consumer, of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in the Senate. See Hearings, supra note 40.
49. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 714
(1979).
50. The first bill, S.2631 was reported favorably by the committee on October
1, 1982, but it was not passed that term. The same bill was re-introduced in April
of 1983 as S.44. It also was not passed during the first session of the 98th Congress, and was again re-introduced in January of 1985 as S.100. After several debates
and some amendments, it was reported out of committee on May 16, 1985. On July
15, 1985, the Committee issued a press-release announcing the release of a new staff
working draft for federal product liability legislation. It should be noted that these
bills have all based manufacturer liability for a product defect almost entirely on
negligence, with the latest draft stating only negligence as the basis for manufacturer
liability. This eliminates all doubt as to the discontinuance by the act of strict liability as a basis of liability for product manufacturers.
51. Much has been written about the need for or undesireability of such federal
product liability legislation. See Hollings, Product Liability Law: Let's Keep the Federal
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tation of a federal products liability law seems inevitable, however,
because the Committee of Commerce has recently undertaken the
development of yet another federal products liability bill."
III.

WORKER'S COMPENSATION THIRD PARTY INEQUITIES

All worker's compensation acts" are largely no-fault compensation systems" ' which require that an employee be paid a statutorily
defined amount for injuries incurred while acting within the scope
of his employment." The employee is allowed to recover worker compensation benefits regardless of his contributory negligence, and the
employer or his insurer must pay the compensation benefits regardless
of the employer's lack of fault for the injury.5 6 This system is not
designed to make an employee whole, but is meant to ensure an injured employee prompt recovery of a certain amount of money."
J. OF TRIAL ADVOC. 347 (1984) (there is no product
liability crisis and federal legislation would cause more confusion than clarification
of products liability law); Twerski, National Product Liability Legislation: In Search
for the Best of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REv. 411 (1982) (federal legislation
unwise). But see Shumway, Needed: A FederalProduct Liability Law, 3 CAL. LAW.
11 (Nov. 1983) (federal legislation would provide predictable national standards);
Schwartz, The Federal Government and the Product Liability Problem: From TaskForce Investigation to Decisions by the Administration, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 573 (1978)
(analysis of the products liability problem and action by federal government); Dworkin,
Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TuL. L. REv. 602 (1982) (federal legislation is needed but not in the area of the current proposals).
52. The latest products liability bill draft, while far from its ultimate form,
contains two alternative compensation schemes from which an injured plaintiff may
choose. One is a no-fault voluntary claims system much like the no-fault worker
compensation system, and the other is the previously attempted codification of the
products liability tort system. The latter alternative contains the clauses that are the
subject of this article.
53. Since 1949 all of the states have passed worker compensation acts, the
majority of which had been enacted by 1920. The federal government enacted the
Federal Employee's Liability Act which protects federal employees. I A. LARSON,

Government Out Of It, 7 AM.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 5.30, at 39-40 (1985).

54. Id. § 1.10, at 1.
55. A very concise definition of the worker's compensation system is that it
"is a mechanism for providing cash-wage benefits and medical care to victims of
work-connected injuries, and for placing the cost of these injuries ultimately on the
consumer, through the medium of insurance, whose premiums are passed on in the
cost of the product." Id. § 1.00, at I.
56. Id. § 1.10, at 1-2.
57. Worker compensation benefits pay the employee all of his hospital and
medical expenses, anywhere from one-half to two-thirds of his wages, and some
variable amount of money for the dependants of a deceased worker. They never
include awards for pain and suffering or punitive damages. Id.
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Although less than his actual damages, the employee receives payment without having to prove any fault of his employer for the injury.
In return for guaranteeing compensation to his injured employees,
the employer receives the assurance that the amount he must pay is
statutorily limited" and that the payment of compensation benefits
is the employee's exclusive remedy against him." 9 This means that the
employee cannot sue his employer in tort for the injury; the employee's
sole remedy is to recover the statutorily determined benefits.6 Further, nearly all state worker compensation acts preserve an employee's
cause of action against a third party whose negligence caused the injury.' Thus, while an employee cannot sue his employer for an injury, he can sue another party who may have been completely or
partially responsible for the employee's injury.' 2 This negligent third
party could be, for example, the driver of a vehicle which struck the
employee, or the manufacturer of a defective machine which caused
the employee's injury.
Finally, most compensation statutes allow the employer to
3
subrogate to his employee's cause of action against a third party.
58. Worker compensation benefits are limited in a sense by the kinds of expenses
that must be paid and the percentage of them that must be paid. The total amount
that an employer may be required to pay out for an injury is capped in only eighteen states. Fifteen of these set the limit at less' than $80,000. Of the other thirty
two states with no statutory cap on payable benefits, the average benefit paid to
a completely disabled employee was $12,175 yearly. Liebman and Sandy, Can the
Open and Obvious Danger rule Coexist with Strict Tort Product Liability? A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 20 AM. Bus.. L.J. 299, 350 (1982).

59. A. LARSON, supra note 53, § 1.10, at 2.
60. Weisgall, supra note 3, at 1039.
61. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 138.5 (1951). Three state statutes do
not preserve an employee's right to sue a third party. 2A A. LARsoN, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW, § 71.00, at 14-1 (1985).
62. Under worker compensation acts, the employer has given up his right to
have his liability to an employee based on fault, and will pay a statutorily determined amount for any disabling injury. The employee's reciprocal concession is not
to sue his employer in tort. A third party, however, is not involved in this agreement
and has not given up any of his rights that would justify his immunization from
suit. Third parties were not meant to be immunized from suit and therefore have
no responsibility for their actions, simply because the injured party was covered by
a worker compensation act. "[E]very mature loss-adjusting mechanism must look in
two directions: it must make the injured person whole, and it must also seek out
the true wrongdoer whenever possible." A. LARSON, supra note 61, §§ 71.00-.10,
at 14-1.
It has been noted that this system does not provide the employee with a windfall, because "what he gets is nothing more than actual restoration to himself of
what he has lost because of the third person's wrongful act." Id. § 71.20, at 14-7.
63. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, 138.5 (1951). The statutes in Georgia,

1986:319]

PRODUCTS LIABILITY LEGISLTION

The employer in this suit may recover damages from a negligent third
party on behalf of the employee." The subrogation right. of the
employer has several effects. First, because the employer finances the
suit, an injured employee with scant economic resources can pursue
a suit against a negligent third party, something he might otherwise
not be able to do. Second, it allows an employer to be reimbursed
for the worker compensation benefits paid to the injured employee.
By passing on to the employee only that amount of the damages award
which exceeds the benefits the employee has received, double recovery
by the employee is prevented. He is not allowed to keep both his
worker compensation benefits and a full common law damages
award."5
This is where the dissatisfaction begins: even in situations where
the employer has been at fault, if his employee is successful in a third
party suit he is entitled to be reimbursed for the full worker compensation benefits outlay first; then the surplus is passed on to the
employee." This scheme has been said to have a discouraging effect
on employers to seek out and remedy potential dangers in the
workplace machinery, because they know that for any injury to an
employee that is caused by a manufacturer's product, they will probably recover any worker's compensation benefits they must pay out.' 7
The dissatisfaction with the current worker compensation system
8
is increased by the existence of comparative negligence principles.
Comparative negligence is the method by which the liability of each
negligent party is determined in proportion to his fault for the injury. 9 The theory underlying the comparative apportionment of
Ohio, and West Virginia do not have subrogation provisions. In these states the
employee is allowed a double recovery. A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 71.30, at 14-50-51
& n. 11.
64. Employer subrogation to the employee's cause of action is achieved in a
variety of ways which include: 1. the automatic subrogation of the employer or insurance carrier to the employee's third-party suit; 2. allowing the employee's suit

and employer's subrogation lien to proceed simultaneously; or 3. allowing one of
them to proceed first in the suit, but if no action is taken within a certain amount

of time, allowing the other party to proceed with the action. Id. § 74.00, at 14-338.
65. Id. § 71.20, at 14-4.
66. Id. § 71.00, at 14-1. There are variations on this also. For example, in
Wisconsin the employee is guaranteed to retain one-third off the top of the damages
award, then the employer is reimbursed and the employee gets the remainder. Id.
§ 74.31(a), at 14-404.
67. See Hearings, supra note 40, at 277.
68. Approximately forty states have enacted some form of comparative
negligence statutes. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 67, at 471.
69. Id. § 67, at 470-71. There are several different forms of comparative
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damages is that a wrongdoer should be made to bear the cost of the
injury proportionate to his own fault. 0 Thus, in states using a comparative negligence approach the plaintiff's damages will be reduced
by the percentage of the damages caused by his own conduct." In
a tort action, the defendant may join any other parties that he feels
may also be liable for the injury. 2 Damages are then assessed against
each defendant in proportion to its fault.' 3
Most states using comparative negligence also apply the common
law rule of joint and several liability.' Under this rule, a plaintiff
may recover his full damages award from only one of the responsible
parties, i.e. from only one of the jointly liable defendants." It is then
up to that defendant to seek contribution or indemnity from the other
responsible party.' 6 The purpose of this rule is to assure that the plaintiff is able to recover his full damages award, and that he will not
be denied his full recovery simply because he cannot find or reach
all of the responsible parties." Thus, while a defendant may be determined to have been only partially at fault for the injury, he can be
made to pay for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages, some
of which were caused by another person. That defendant who pays
then has, however, a cause of action against the person whose share
of the damages he had to pay.8

negligence, basically those of pure, modified, or slight-gross systems, a full survey
of which is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally, id. § 67.
70. See id. § 67, at 470-73.
71. Id.§ 67, at 472.
72. Id.§ 67, at 475.
73. For example, the plaintiff in a situation like this may be a pedestrian who
was injured when he was struck by the defendant's car. The defendant, however,
may feel that he was not entirely responsible for the injury. In addition to claiming
the plaintiff himself was partially at fault, the defendant may join as a defendant
another party whose negligence may also have contributed to the accident. This could
be, for instance, another negligent driver. Using the principle of comparative
negligence, it may be determined that the pedestrian plaintiff was himself 20% at
fault for the accident, and that the other two defendants were each 400 at fault.
From a $100,000 damages award, $20,000 is subtracted because that is the amount
represented by the plaintiff's own negligence. The two defendants who were 40%
at fault each pay $40,000, totalling $80,000 in damages recovered by the plaintiff.
74. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 67, at 475.
75. Id.
76. The rationale for the rule of joint and several liability is that the burden
of seeking out all the responsible parties should be on a blameworthy party, rather
than a faultless party. See id. § 67, at 475.
77. Id.

78. Id.
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The interaction of worker compensation acts and the theory of
joint and several liability produces an anomaly. In a suit by an injured employee against a third party, .where both the employer and
the third party were responsible for the injury, the third party cannot
implead the employer for the purpose of seeking contribution." While
worker compensation statutes generally do not have provisions regarding a third party's rights to contribution from the employer, courts
arrive at the conclusion that third parties may not seek contribution
from an employer by interpreting the exclusive-remedy provision."
Under this provision, the employer is not liable in tort to his employee,
but is only liable for the statutorily determined amount under the
applicable worker compensation act. 8 ' Courts therefore have consistently held that employers are not joint tortfeasors with a third party.8 2
In suits against a negligent third party defendant where the plaintiff
is co-incidentally covered by a worker compensation act, then the third
party defendant is not allowed to seek contribution from a joint tortfeasor who is an employer.8 3 To allow contribution by the employer
would defeat the exclusive-remedy provision in the acts." ' The obvious inequity is that the third party, who must pay the entire damages
award, is made to bear more than his proportionate amount of the
damages when the other responsible party happens to be immune from
suit by a compensation act.85

IV.

INTERACTION OF THE

Two

SYSTEMS

When the worker compensation system and products liability law

interact within the same tort action, inequity often results. The defen-

dant involved is the manufacturer of a product which caused the
employee's injury and which is allegedly defective. The manufacturer
is also the defendant in a suit in which the plaintiff, who is an

employee, and another person whose negligence contributed to the
employee's injury, the employer, are covered by a state worker's com-

pensation act. This defendant, therefore, must face not only the problems that exist for manufacturers in the state's products liability law,"
but also the problem for third party defendants under the state
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Robinson, supra note 2, at 265.
Id.
See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 1 138.5 (1951).
Robinson, supra note 2, at 265.
Id.
See A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 76.11, at 14-562.
Id. at 265-66.
See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
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worker's compensation act: he cannot obtain contribution to the
damages award from a concurrently negligent employer. s7 The result
is that the defendant manufacturer will be held liable for a large products liability damages award, of which he must pay the entire amount
in spite of concurring negligence of the employer.
At this point perhaps it would be helpful to give an illustration
in order to better understand the inequity present. Suppose, for
example, that W is a worker employed by E company, a tool and
die factory. E purchases a drill press to use in the workplace from
M, a manufacturer of drill presses. W is injured while using the drill
press, and he receives worker compensation benefits from E for his
injury. W also sues M, however, because the drill press contained
a defect which caused his injury. If W recovers damages from M,
E is reimbursed from the damages award for his worker compensation benefits outlay and W receives the remainder of the award. In
the long run, then, E has paid nothing for W's injury. This is a fair
result if M was indeed entirely responsible for W's injury. E should
not have to bear the cost of M's negligence by paying compensation
benefits for an injury that M caused.
If, however, E was also at fault for W's injury because, for
example, E removed a safety guard from the drill press and the combination of this act and the existing defect caused W's injury, then
the result is unfair. E has been reimbursed for his worker compensation benefits outlay when he, in fact, was partially at fault for W's
injury. M, in this case, is actually bearing the cost of E's negligence
by having to pay the entire damages award for an injury for which
he was only partially at fault. M cannot implead E or seek contribution from E either, because E is only liable to W for compensation
benefits and cannot be made to contribute to the damages award given
to W.
V.

STATE COURT ACTION

In response to the inequity existing in the above described situation, courts in a few states have formulated different solutions to
87. One can immediately see the situations where this would be desirable and
those where it would not: when the employer was not at fault at all for the injury,
it is desirable for him to recover the worker compensation benefits he has paid,
and for the manufacturer to pay the entire damages award. When the employer has
been at fault, however, it is undesirable and contrary to the theory of comparative
negligence to place the burden of the entire damages award on the manufacturer,
who was only partially responsible. Perhaps even more undesirable than this is the
fact that the employer gets reimbursed for his compensation benefits outlay and in
the end pays nothing for the employee's injury.
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the problem. In North Carolina"8 and California, 9 for instance, courts
have modified the existing worker compensation acts by allowing the
defendant in a suit to reduce his damages liability by the amount
of worker compensation benefits payable to the injured employee plaintiff.9 This can be done, however, only when the employer who has
paid the compensation benefits was also determined to be at fault
for the employee's injury."
In these two states, when the manufacturer of a product that
purportedly caused an employee's injury is being sued by an employee
who is covered by a worker compensation act, if the manufacturer
feels that the employer was also at fault for the injury, the manufacturer can have the employer's fault determined in the suit. 2 If the
employer is found to also have been negligent, to any extent, the
manufacturer may reduce the damages award against him by the
amount of worker compensation benefits the employee received. 3 In
effect, the rule eliminates the employer's subrogation lien and the
accompanying right to be reimbursed for his worker compensation
benefits outlay when his own negligence has also contributed to the
employee's injury. Since the employee retains the benefits, the third
party defendant reduces his liability by that amount. Both the negligent
employer and the negligent third party have then contributed toward
payment of the employee's damages.'
Using the earlier example to illustrate, suppose that our worker
W received $15,000 in compensation benefits from E for his injury,
and obtained a $100,000 damages award against M. If E is determined to have been at all at fault for the injury, then M may reduce
the damages award against him and pay W only $85,000 of the
88. Hunsucker v. High Point Bending and Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d

768 (1953).
89. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
90. Larson, Third Party Action Over Against a Workmen's Compensation

1982 DUKE L.J. 483, 493.
91. Id. The California courts, however, will not use this rule in a strict lia-

Employer,

bility case. They agree with the majority of courts that the manufacturer of a defective product cannot plead the employer's negligence as a defense and therefore must
bear the entire loss themselves of an injury sustained by a product which was defective. Apparently, though, the California courts will, even in a strict liability case,
reduce the damages award against the manufacturer by the amount of compensation
benefits paid to the plaintiff if the manufacturer can prove that "the employer was
aware of the danger and nevertheless used the defective product to cause plaintiff's
injury." Weisgall, supra note 3, at 1063 (citing Levels v. Growers Ammonia Supply
Co., 48 Cal. App.3d 443, 121 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1975)).

92. See Larson, supra note 90, at 493.
93. See id. at 493.
94. See id.
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damages award. E is then denied his right to reimbursement for the
worker compensation benefits outlay and W retains the benefits. The
end result is that E has contributed $15,000 and M has contributed
$85,000 toward the damages W sustained."
Concededly, this rule is accurate in allocating the amount of liability in proportion to fault only when the employer's percentage of
fault is exactly represented by the amount of worker compensation
benefits paid. 96 Nonetheless, it is arguably fairer than a strict nocontribution rule because it attempts' to reduce a defendant's damages
liability for an injury for which an employer was also responsible.
Since both parties have been adjudged at fault for the injury, both
are made to contribute to the damages award. 9"
Minnesota has employed a similar solution to the inequitable
results obtained in these third party suits."8 It allows the third party
95. See id.
96. If E's percentage of negligence is determined to have been 15% and M's
to have been 85%, then this rule accurately allocates the cost of the injury in proportion to each party's negligence. E had to pay $15,000 in worker compensation
benefits, which represents 15% of the total damages award and is equal to his percentage of negligence. Similarly, M pays $85,000, which is 85% of the total damages
award and also represents his percentage of negligence for the injury.
This rule, however, still has inequitable results in two situations. First, if the
employer's percentage of fault for the injury is less than the percentage of the total
damages award that is represented by the worker compensation benefits paid to the
employee, the manufacturer is allowed to pay less than his percentage of the damages.
If, for example, E had been only 10% at fault for the injury and M had been 90%
at fault, then because the $15,000 in compensation benefits represent 15% of the
$100,000 damages award, then E is paying for 15% of the injury that he was only
10% responsible for. E pays for a greater percentage of the damages than his own
negligence caused. Furthermore, M, who was 90% at fault for the injury, pays only
$85,000, or 85% of the total damages award. This rule, then, will shift the cost
of M's negligence to E in certain instances.
Second, this rule will frequently still force a defendant to pay for more than
his share of the damages. This occurs in situations opposite from the one described
above: when the percentage of the employer's negligence was greater than the amount
of the damages award represented by the worker compensation benefits paid to the
employee. Again using our illustration in which W has received $15,000 in worker
compensation benefits and has obtained a $100,000 damages award against M, if
E's negligence represents an amount greater than 15%, the amount represented by
the worker compensation benefits he has paid to W, then M must pay for damages
that E actually caused. If E is 30% at fault for the injury and M is 70% at fault,
M still only gets to reduce the $100,000 damages award by the $15,000 worker compensation benefits paid to W. M must therefore pay $85,000, which is 85% of the
damages for which he was 70% responsible.
97. See Hunsucker, 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953).
98. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977).
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to seek contribution from the employer in proportion to his fault,
but such contribution may not exceed the amount payable in worker
compensation benefits.9 This result also considers the employer's
negligence with regard to his contribution. It requires the employer
to pay the amount of damages his negligence caused under the
applicable comparative negligence standard. The difference is that it
cuts off his liability at the amount equal to his responsibility under
the worker compensation act.
To illustrate this rule with our example from above, suppose W
has received $15,000 in worker compensation benefits from E and
$100,000 damages from M. In most states E would be reimbursed
for the worker compensation benefits. In Minnesota, however, E will
not be able to recover the amount of damages represented by his
own negligence. If E was 10% at fault for W's injury then he will
not be able to recover $10,000 of the worker compensation benefits
because that is 10% of the $100,000 damages award. E may therefore
recover only $5,000 of his $15,000 benefits outlay. If, on the other
hand, E had been 50% at fault for the injury, he will not be made
to pay $50,000, which is 50% of the damages award, but rather his
liability will be cut off at the amount represented by the worker compensation benefits, i.e. $15,000. As a result, E is not reimbursed for
the benefits that he has paid W and in this way contributes $15,000
toward an injury for which he was 50% at fault.
Note that in these two aberrations of the traditional subrogation
right/exclusive-remedy provisions, the employer's fault is considered
0 The
when determining if and how much he should contribute.'
possibility remains open that he will not have to pay any contribution and hence will be reimbursed for his compensation outlay, if
in fact he has been faultless for the injury. In these instances the
third party then pays the entire damages award, for which he was
entirely responsible. This result is in accord with basic principles of
fairness and equity.

99. See id. The court in Lambertson listed the interest of the parties that are
to be protected in third party suits: "The employer has a primary interest in limiting
his payment for employee injury to the worker's compensation schedule and a secondary interest in receiving reimbursement when a third party causes him to incur obligations to his employee. The employee has a primary interest in receiving full worker's
compensation benefits and, to the extent a third party caused him injury, a commonlaw recovery from that third party. In contrast, the third party's interest is that of
any other co-tortfeasor-to limit its liability to no more than its established fault."
257 N.W.2d at 685.
100. See supra notes 86-91, 96-97 and accompanying text.
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In Illinois'"' and New York'0 2 the courts have gone farther than
any in attempting to solve the third party exclusive-remedy dilemma.' 3
They allow a third party manufacturer to seek contribution by the
employer to the full extent of the employer's proportionate fault.'10
If the employer was 50% at fault for the injury then he must pay

101. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach; Co., 70 I11. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d
437 (1977).
102. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972). In Dole, the court rationalized this holding by stating that the manufacturer's cause of action for indemnity from the employer was not based on the fact
of the employee's death (which may have been treated as an unacceptable attempt
to circumvent the exclusive-remedy provision) but rather on the breach of an independent duty owed to the manufacturer by the employer. Id.
103. Comment, The Exclusive Remedy Controversy: Can Third Party Inequity
Be Alleviated Without Disturbing the Principles of Workers' Compensation? 29 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 489, 502 [hereinafter cited as The Exclusive Remedy Controversy].
104. In the Illinois Skinner case, the injured employee sued, in strict liability,
the manufacturer of an allegedly defective injection molding machine which caused
the employee's injury. The manufacturer then filed a third party complaint against
the employer, alleging misuse of the machine and seeking contribution from the
employer. The employer defended the action with the long-standing common law
rule in Illinois of "no right of contribution among tortfeasors." The Illinois Supreme
Court took note of the harsh results produced by the no-contribution rule, which
frequently shifted the complete burden of a loss onto only one of two equally responsible parties. It also noted the trend toward development of other theories designed
to mitigate the harshness of the no-contribution rule, and concluded that there was
no reason to continue with this rule. The court stated that where it has created a
rule which has become unjust, it not only has the power but the duty to abolish it.
The employer argued further that because the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act bars an employee's action in tort against his employer, a manufacturer cannot seek contribution from that employer. The court held, however, that a statutory
restraint on an employee that precludes him from suing his employer in tort does
not also preclude a manufacturer from seeking indemnification or contribution from
the employer. The court then concluded that "the governing equitable principles require that ultimate liability for plaintiff's injuries be apportioned on the basis of
the relative degree to which the defective product and the employer's conduct proximately caused them."
The dissenting justices in Skinner criticized the majority for allowing the liability of the parties to be apportioned on the basis of their relative roles. The action
against the manufacturer was for strict liability in tort, without regard to his fault;
the action against the employer, on the other hand, was based solely on his negligence.
The dissenters stated that the formula of the majority for determining each party's
degree of liability cannot be applied when there is no common standard of comparisQn with which to apply the formula. The majority was further criticized by
the dissenting justices for their decision to allow contribution at all, because this
decision "repudiates

Act became law."

. .

. the very theory upon which the Workmen's Compensation
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50% of the employee's damages award.'10

337

In these two states, the

exclusive-remedy provision is in part rendered ineffective. While an
employee still may not directly sue his employer in tort, a third party

may seek contribution or indemnity from a negligent employer
regardless of what the employer's responsibility was under the
applicable compensation statute.'06 Again, any contribution at all by
the employer is predicated on the finding that he was at fault.

VI.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

The third party worker compensation dilemma has been analyzed
extensively over the years by scholars. From these analyses of the
problem have come several proposed solutions, some of which should
be noted here.
One suggestion has been made to eliminate third party suits
altogether and simply restrict an injured employee's remedy to worker
compensation benefits. 0 7 This solution, however, is difficult to reconcile with the theory that a tortfeasor should be made to pay his fair
share of damages because the manufacturer would be escaping liability
for his negligence. It also leaves the employee with an inadequate
remedy for his injury because worker compensation benefits do not
compensate the employee for the full cost of his injury. The proposal goes on to suggest an increase in the amount of statutory benefits
105. See Larson, supra note 90, at 498.
106. See Comment, The Exclusive Remedy Controversy, supra note 103, at
504-05. Shortly after the Skinner decision, the Illinois legislature passed a statute
which seemed to disallow actions for contribution from negligent employers. (Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 70,
301-303 (1981)
(hereinafter referred to as the Contribution Act)). The Contribution Act expressly
overruled the common law no-contribution rule that was also rejected in Skinner.
The Act expressly allows contribution among persons- "subject to liability in
tort arising out of the same injury . . . " (emphasis supplied). This act was effective
in 1979, and made applicable to causes of action arising on or after March 1, 1978,
which perhaps coincidentally is the same date as the Skinner decision.
The legislature's choice of the words "in tort" indicated to some that the Contribution Act only allowed contribution among those parties who were commonly
liable in tort to a plaintiff. Since an employer is not liable in tort to his employee,
the initial reaction to the Contribution Act was that it sought to modify the Skinner
decision. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 90, at 499-500.
In the recent case of Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 ll.2d 1, 461 N.E.2d 382 (1984),
however, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the Contribution Act to be a codification of the Skinner rule, which permitted a third party to seek contribution from
a negligent employer. The court in Doyle looked to the legislative debates on the
Contribution Act and held that it was intended to codify and clarify the Skinner
decision. Comment, The Exclusive Remedy Controversy, supra note 103, at 503.
107. Weisgall, supra note 3, 1071-80.
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the employer must pay, and allows the employer to seek contribution
or indemnity for the benefits outlay from a negligent third party.' 0°
This is basically the reverse of the present situation in that under
this proposal the employer must initially bear the entire cost of the
employee's injury and later seek contribution from the third party.
Another proposed solution purports to maintain both the integrity
of worker compensation statutes and principles of comparative
negligence.' 9 This proposal is aimed directly at reformation of state
worker compensation acts. It would require employers to pay the
statutorily determined amount for a compensable injury, and would
eliminate the employer's subrogation right. Further, it would determine the third party's damages liability in proportion to his fault for
the injury. The admitted deficiency in this proposal is that the employee
0
will not recover his full amount of damages."1
The hypothetical used earlier can be useful in understanding how
this proposal would operate. In the situation where W has received
$15,000 in worker compensation benefits from E and $100,000 in
damages from M, E will not be allowed to recover the cost of his
worker compensation benefits outlay if W is successful in his suit
against M. M will only pay the percentage of the damages award
for which he was responsible. If M is determined to have been 50%
at fault for W's injury he will pay $50,000. The end result is that
E has paid $15,000 for the injury and M has paid $50,000. W has
recovered $65,000 for his $100,000 damages."' The justification is
that W will still receive more than if E alone were responsible for
the injury. The advantages stated are that the employer is held to
no more than the worker compensation benefits and the third party
is made to pay for no more than it was responsible." 2The disadvantages to this solution, however, are not as clearly explained. This
solution assumes that the employer is always at fault for a work place
injury. This is evident because it makes no provision for situations
where the employer's percentage of fault is less than that represented
by the worker compensation award. In other words, E is still denied
reimbursement of his $15,000 worker compensation benefits outlay,

108. Id.

109. Comment, The Exclusive Remedy Controversy, supra note 103, at 505.
110. Id.
11l.Id.

112. A third advantage is noted as that of encouraging safety in the workplace.
Employers will know they cannot recover worker compensation benefits paid out

for any injury and employees will realize that if injured, they will not be fully com-

pensated for their injuries. Id.
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which represents 15% of the total damages, even when he was less
than 150%c responsible for the injury." 3
Thus, while the employer is held to pay no more than the worker
compensation benefits he is always held to exactly those, and is
apparently unable to recover his benefits outlay when he has not been
negligent at all or only minimally so. This system would cause the
employer to bear some of the cost of another's negligence, and causes
a result that goes against the tort principle of making a negligent
party bear the cost of his own negligence."4
The problems facing a defendant manufacturer in a suit in which
he cannot implead a concurrently negligent employer"' are problems
which stem from two different and distinct sources: current state products liability law and state worker compensation statutes. The Senate
committee which has been studying the products liability problem intensively and which is trying to formulate a federal products liability
law,"16 however, proposes to also solve the manufacturers' worker
compensation acts problem. The committee would do this by including
in the products liability law two provisions that would affect worker
compensation acts. The problem lies, however, within the worker compensation system itself and is best dealt with by separate legislation
that is designed with worker compensation in mind, not products
liability.
VII.
A.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION

FEDERAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT

The last three federal product liability proposals by the Senate
committee have all been aimed at clarifying and codifying products
liability.' 7 The goal is to promote certainty for the manufacturer,
thus relieving him of hidden liabilities." 8 These proposals, however,
have also included provisions aimed at remedying the manufacturer's
problems when he is the defendant in a suit where the plaintiff is
an employee covered by a worker compensation act.
113. Further, this proposal makes no provisions for situations when the third

party is completely responsible for the injury. For example, if the third party is found
100% responsible for the $100,000 damages award, and the worker has received

$15,000 in benefits, the employee in this system would recover $115,000, thereby

profiting from his injury.
114. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 48.

117. See supra note 46-52 and accompanying text.
118. Hearings, supra note 40 at 1.
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The provisions that the legislature would include in any such products liability act are generally as follows:

1) The automatic reduction of a manufacturer's damages liability
by the amount of worker compensation benefits paid or payable to
the employee for his injury;
2) the elimination of the employer's subrogation lien, which
would deny the employer reimbursement for his worker compensation benefits outlay; and

3) the elimination of a third party action for contribution or

indemnity against the employer.
If included in federal products liability legislation, the first two
provisions will have a drastic effect on the current worker compensation system." 9 The purpose of these provisions is to reduce litigation
costs. 2 What the legislature is overlooking is the inequitable result
for the employer, and in certain cases, for the employee.
This proposed system for damages would essentially correct an
existing "wrong" with another "wrong." The existing wrong is that
manufacturers frequently must pay a larger percentage of the damages

than they were responsible for because of the co-incidental effect of
a worker compensation act.' 2 ' Under the proposed system, however,
it is the employer who would be automatically barred from recovering his worker compensation outlay when the third party defendant
happened to be a product manufacturer whose product caused the
injury. The difficulty with this system is that the employer's subrogation right is eliminated regardless of the employer's freedom from
fault. 22 Thus, even in cases where the employer was completely free

119. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
120. See S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-49 [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].

Representatives of the National Machine and Tool Builders Association
(hereinafter NMTBA) perceive the purpose of the first provision to be that of preventing double recovery by the plaintiff. Under the current system, however, in only
three states does the potential for double recovery exist. In the other forty-seven
states double recovery is prevented by the reimbursement for the employer's worker's
compensation benefits outlay from the employee's damages award. What the NMTBA
fails to mention is that this provision achieves the same result as is had under the
current worker's compensation law, only at the expense of the employers: manufacturers would be the ones to prevent double recovery by retaining the amount equal
to the worker compensation benefits. This provision, in effect, would merely shift
the expense of the injury from the manufacturer to the employer. See Hearings,
supra note 40, at 276.
121. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
122. The NMTBA says that subrogation liens allow a negligent employer to pass
the cost of worker compensation benefits to the manufacturer because they operate
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of any wrongdoing,' 3 if his employee was injured by a defective product, he must automatically bear part of the expense of the injury.
In effect, the relationship between the manufacturer and the applicable
worker compensation act is changed from being burdensome to being
beneficial.'2 4 The manufacturer, instead of having to pay more than
his fair share of the damages, will now be able to pay less. Any time
the employer's negligence is less than the percentage of total damages
represented by the worker compensation benefits, the manufacturer
comes out ahead.
Suppose, for example, that E is 15/0 at fault for the injury and
M is 85%/a percent at fault. In the absence of a worker compensation
act and under the principles of pure comparative negligence, E should
pay $15,000 of a $100,000 damages award and M should pay $85,000.
Under the proposed system, however, if W has received $20,000 in
worker compensation benefits, M only has to pay $80,000-which
is 8001o of the cost of an injury for which he was 850a responsible.
Further, the burden of this discrepancy falls on E, who must pay
20016 of the damages of an injury for which he was 150a at fault.
The inequity in this result is even more striking in those situations
in which E was zero percent at fault for the injury, but will be made
to pay a certain percentage of the damages through worker compensation benefits. The coincidental existence of a worker compensation
relationship would insulate a third party from having to pay the full
amount of damages that his negligence caused.' 5
The third provision, that of barring an action for contribution
against the employer, is apparently the quidpro quo that the employers
receive for the elimination of their subrogation rights.'", The purpose
of it is to reinforce the employer's immunity to contribution actions,
which is perceived by some as being eroded in some states.' 2 7 The
regardless of employer fault. The proposed legislation, however, would also do this
but with regard to different parties. Manufacturers will be able to pass part of their
liability on to the employers, regardless of the employer's non-fault. Hearings,supra

note 40, at 277.
123. While S. REP. 670 states that "employer negligence is estimated to be involved in over half of employees' product-related suits

. ..

" this is far from being

involved in 100% of employee suits. SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 47.
124. See A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 71.20, at 14-7.
125. In a discussion of the result to each party under the current worker's compensation scheme, it is noted that "to reduce [the manufacturer's] burden because
of the relation between the employer and the employee would be a windfall to him
which he has done nothing to deserve ... ." A. LARSON, supra note 61, § 71.20,

at 14-7.
126.

SENATE REPORT,

supra note 120, at 49.

127. The Senate Report reported two ways in which employer tort immunity
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claim that this provision will bar an employer from having to pay

contribution is not entirely accurate, however, because the first provision amounts to just that: mandatory contribution by the employer,
regardless of his fault.
While the worker compensation system concededly was designed
to make employers pay for employee injuries regardless of the
employers' fault, it was not intended to punish faultless employers

and force them to bear the cost of another's negligence. ' This is
partially the purpose of the employer's subrogation right.' 9 When
the true wrongdoer can be ascertained, it is he who should bear the

cost of his wrongdoing.'
B.

30

IMPLICATIONS

It is thus clear that the proposed clauses will create a significant

change in the present worker compensation law. '3' Doing so under
the guise of product liability legislation, however, is inappropriate.
Under the aforementioned rulings in a few states which attempt to

alleviate inequity to a third party,' 32 the relief is granted to all types

of third parties. The current proposal, on the other hand, would limit
this relief to only those third parties who are manufacturers of an
injury-causing product. While the legislature has the power to correct
problems one step at a time, it is arguable that since all other third
parties are just as much in need of relief, it would be more appropriate
to create legislation aimed at solving the problem of all third parties, not

just of some.

is weakening: 1. When the employer acts in a "dual capacity," being both the
manufacturer of the defective product and the employer of the injured employee;
and 2. in certain instances when the manufacturer is trying to get contribution from
a negligent employer. Id. at 47.
128. See Fisher v. Missoula White Pine Sash Co., 164 Mont. 41, 518 P.2d 795
(1974) ("The purpose of the subrogation provisions is to compensate the employer
and his insurer to some extent for the additional liability they must assume under
the Workmen's Compensation Act for wrongful acts of independent third party
tortfeasors.")
129. The court in Lambertson noted two benefits of allowing an employee to
seek a third party recovery: (1)The at-fault third party is made to reimburse the
employer who has been forced to bear the cost of the third party's activity; (2) the
employee obtains a full common-law recovery against the third party who is not
subject to the benefits and burdens of the worker's compensation system." 275 N.W.2d
at 684-85.
130. A. LARSON, supra note 61, §71.00 at 14-1.
131. The federal product liability legislation would preempt any conflicting state
laws.
132. See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
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It is also apparent that by using a product liability act to modify
worker compensation acts, the legislature is not focusing on the extent
of the effect it will have. If a manufacturer is allowed to automatically
reduce his damages liability by worker compensation benefits, the effect in states like Illinois and New York' 33 will be to allow the manufacturer to actually pay less than his proportionate share of damages.
As previously discussed, Illinois and New York courts have
developed rules which in one respect render ineffective the exclusiveremedy provision of the applicable worker compensation act. While
an employee still may not sue his employer directly in tort, a manufacturer being sued by an employee is allowed to seek contribution from
a negligent employer to the full extent of his liability. The manufacturer then pays only for the proportionate amount of damages he
has caused. With this understanding, one can immediately see the result
under the proposed legislation: the manufacturer pays only for his
proporationate amount of the damages, which he then gets to reduce
by the amount of worker compensation benefits payable to the injured employee.' 3 Not only does this allow the manufacturer to pay
for less than the percentage of damages he caused, but it leaves the
injured worker with substantially less than his damages award.
An illustration of this result using the earlier hypothetical may
be helpful. In Illinois and New York, when E and M both cause W's
injury, they must both contribute to the damages award given to W.
In other words, if W's injury was caused 50% by E's negligence and
50% by M's defective product, they will each have to pay 50% of
the $100,000 damages award that W is awarded. Of the $50,000 that
E must pay, $15,000 is worker compensation benefits. Under the proposed language in the products liability bill, M may reduce the damages
award against him by the amount of worker compensation benefits
that W has received, i.e. $15,000. By following exactly the language
in the proposed legislation, the end result is that E pays W $50,000,
$15,000 worker compensation benefits and $35,000 in damages. M
pays W $35,000, which is $50,000 in damages minus the $15,000
worker compensation benefits that W received. In other words, E pays
50% of the damages for which he was 50% at fault, and M pays
35% of the damages for which he also was 50% at fault.
It is quite possible, and in fact likely, that this was not the result
intended by the drafters of the new products liability legislation.'"

133. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.

135. Throughout the hearings it is repeatedly stated that the purpose of the pro-
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While it is a problem that can be easily remedied, 3 the fact that
this language appears in a draft for a fourth products liability bill
is indicative that a thorough examination of its effects on the worker
compensation system is warranted.
VIII.

AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION

There is another remedy, however, that would incorporate the
best elements from several of the existing and proposed solutions.
By combining the solutions arrived at in states like North Carolina
and Minnesota 3 " with suggestions proposed by scholars, 3 ' it may be
possible to develop a scheme that would maximize protection of all
the parties involved.
Using a theory of limited contribution that is predicated on fault,
as is done by state courts, and the theory of comparative negligence,
it is possible to limit a third party's liability and still not force an
employer to bear the cost of another's negligence.
The solution is to allow a third party defendant to seek limited
contribution from a negligent employer up to the amount for which
the employer would be responsible under the applicable worker compensation act. This will entail joining the employer as a defendant
in the third party suit for purposes of determining his percentage of
fault. The parties' respective percentages of fault will be determined,
and the third party will pay the amount of total damages equal to
his percentage of fault. The employer, if negligent, will be made to
pay the amount equal to his percentage of fault, but no more than
the worker compensation benefits.
Under such a rule the employer would retain his subrogation right
in cases where he has been free from fault and the third party was
entirely responsible for the accident. This prevents the employer from
having to bear the cost of another's negligence and prevents the third
party- from paying less than the amount of damages he caused. The
third party is made to pay for no more than the percentage of damages
he caused, however, which is in accord with principles of comparative
negligence.

duct liability legislation is to place the burden of an injury on responsible parties
in proportion to their fault. See, e.g. Hearings, supra note 40, at 2.
136. The drafters could have added a provision which stipulated a different way
of calculating damages in states such as Illinois and New York.
137. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 107-116 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
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Under this approach, the amount the injured employee will recover
will vary. If the third party is entirely responsible for the injury, he
will pay the total damages award and the employer will be reimbursed
for his compensation benefits outlay. If he is less than 100% liable
for the injury, then this is because the employer is found partially liable. In that case, if the percentage of the employer's negligence
is less than the perceritage of damages represented by compensation
benefits, then he will pay the lesser of the two, the amount equal
to his negligence.
For example, in a situation where W receives $20,000 in worker
compensation benefits and where his total damages are determined
to be $100,000, if E is partially at fault he can be made to contribute
up to 20% of the total damages. The $20,000 in worker compensation benefits, for which E is responsible, represent 20% of the total
damages. If E is 15% at fault, he will contribute $15,000 to W's
damages."" In other words, E will not be able to exercise his subrogation lien to recover $15,000 of the worker compensation benefits he
has paid to W.
If, however, E's responsibility exceeds 20% of the total damages,
he cannot be made to contribute any more than $20,000 toward the
damages award. If E is 30% at fault, he still only pays $20,000, which
are the worker compensation benefits that he has paid out and cannot
now recover. In these instances, M's negligence will be less than 80%,
but he will not be made to pay 80% of the total damages. M will
pay for the percentage of the damages that he was responsible for.
If E was 30% at fault and M was 70% at fault, E pays $20,000,
the amount represented by the worker compensation benefits, and
M pays $70,000 toward the $100,000 damages award.
W will not, obviously, recover his total damages all of the time.
In the previous example W recovered a total of $90,000 for his
$100,000 damages award. This is actually a fair result, however, because
in these instances when W is not recovering what has been determined to be his full amount of damages, he is nevertheless recovering the full amount for which M was responsible, and the full statutory
amount for which E was responsible."' This result comports with
both'the theory of worker's compensation and the reasonable expectations of the injured employees, for such employees know that their
employer's liability is statutorily limited.
140. E contributes this amount by not being able to recover $15,000 of the
$20,000 worker compensation benefits he had paid to W. The result is that E recovers
$5,000.
141. Comment, The Exclusive Remedy Controversy, supra note. 103, at 507.
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If, on the other hand, E was zero percent negligent and M was
100% negligent, M will pay 1000o of the damages and E will retain
his subrogation lien and be reimbursed for his worker compensation
benefits outlay. In this situation W will receive his full $100,000
damages award, paid by M. Since E was not negligent, he is reimbursed for the compensation benefits and is not forced to bear any
of the cost of M's negligence, as would be the situation under the
proposed legislation.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In an attempt to alleviate some of the inequities present in products liability law, the legislature is formulating a federal products
liability bill. This bill, if passed, will set out uniform standards of
care for manufacturers, applicable in every state. The hope is that
it will create certainty about liability in this area of the law, which
will in turn reduce manufacturer susceptibility to suit. But the bill
goes farther than this, even, and will also attempt to solve the manufacturers' problem with the current worker compensation system when
they are sued by an injured employee, which is that of having to
pay a greater portion of the damages than for which they were at
fault. Such a measure would drastically change state worker compensation laws and will result in an inequitable situation for employers,
as the cost of the manufacturer's liability is shifted to the employer.
Further, this solution is only partial because it will only affect suits
in which a manufacturer is a defendant and would not apply to all
third party suits. The legislature should focus on one problem at a
time and be thorough with each. There are two separate problems
here, for which two separate, carefully planned solutions are needed
if the solution is not going to create as much inequity as it is trying
to solve.
JUDITH
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